A. V. Dicey, Lectures on Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1905) 150 n. 1. Dicey thought this point 'elementary' but 'worth insisting upon'. My friend Carol Weisbrod of the University of Connecticut School of Law first alerted me to this passage. The nexus between law, public opinion and the relative protection of the flag and the Constitution as they travelled the globe was obvious to Finley Peter Dunne. Indeed, his most famous saying was, 'No matter whether th' constitution follows the' flag or not, th' Supreme Court follows th' iliction returns'. Finley Peter Dunne, 'The Supreme Court Decisions' in Elmer Ellis, ed.,Mr. Dooley at His Best (Hamden, 1938) 77. But long after San Juan Hill and Manila Bay, the vexing issue of how much protection the flag, the Constitution, or some combination thereof should provide individuals and corporations overseas still confused United States Supreme Court Justices as well as the rest of the population. I hasten to reassure that this subject is not one I wish to explore here. For recent work considering Blackstone's great influence in the United States, see, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge, 1985) 15 ('the Commentaries rank second only to the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence on the history of American institutions'); R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice In this essay I will consider how the United States Supreme Court embraced Dicey's epigram and translated it into decisions during the tenures of Chief Justices Fuller and White about the capacity of the individual in the United States to contract and care for himself. By focusing on the Court from 1888 to 1921, I do not seek to demonstrate again that there is and always has been a chasm between law in books and law in action. Nor do I make any claim that paternalism was a new problem when Fuller succeeded Waite, or a problem that had been resolved in 1921 when Taft took the enlarged seat he coveted at the center of the Court. My thesis is that under the guise of a formalistic, unitary vision of categories such as individual autonomy and citizenship, the Justices subdivided and manipulated legal doctrine about suitable protection in a way that arrogated tremendous discretionary power to themselves. In proclaiming both their authority and their ability to distinguish between people as individuals and as members of groups, the judicial brethren became the paternalistic patriarchs.
In considering efforts to restrict what judges viewed as debilitating paternalism masquerading as protection, I will use the following as a definition of paternalism: a decision made by someone for someone else, allegedly for the latter's own good. Paternalism relates directly to Dicey's formulation. Can one have protective legal intervention without making some statement about the disability of purported beneficiaries?
To the modern eye, or to even a mediocre anagrams player, there is an obvious connection between the loathed concept 'paternalism' and the more neutral, if not positive, notion of 'parentalism'. Yet paternalism remains one of our most powerful pejoratives.
Lochner v. New York, 2 nearly always invoked to categorize the entire era, is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of subjective judicial activism. 3 I am not here concerned with all of the ways in which Lochner itself may have been anomalous, 4 but I am interested in the concept of autonomous individualism inherent in the notion of liberty of contract which was at stake in Lochner. That legal idea affords a means to examine how true the Court was to prevailing laissez-faire principles. 5 Grant Gilmore's observation that ' [t]he few people . . . who have ever spent much time studying the judicial product of the period have been appalled by what they found' 6 is in itself an intriguing challenge. Moreover, a sampling of judicial decisions involving governmental protection of those deemed unfit shows that the Justices were caught in a bind of their own creation, forced to perform gymnastic feats to find and hold the line between legal spheres they claimed they were obliged to separate. The Justices manipulated the deductive pretensions of their categorical approach to people as individuals and as members of groups in several ways. While acting aggressively to protect the interests of corporations, 7 which were conviction imposed on a lawyer for charging more than the statutory maximum allowed for processing a widow ' proclaimed to have equal rights as persons, they acted with paternalistic condescension toward others, such as women, Indians, and sailors, whose claims for equal treatment they viewed as contrary to the natural order. Simultaneously, however, the Court disabled some citizens, such as blacks, by approaching their claims with extreme arms-length formality, declaring that black men already had achieved full legal equality.
The paradox of paternalism-encouraging and applying some form of protection while excoriating and invalidating others-may also fill some of the void left by the shrinking of the orthodox view of laissez-faire constitutionalism. There has been considerable recent scholarly debate about the extent of Social Darwinism in late nineteenth century America. Indeed, David Hollinger quipped, 'Social Darwinism can now claim a dubious honor: that it has been shown not to have existed in more places than any other movement in the history of social theory'.8 Yet the avoidance of paternalism was an appealing surrogate for more explicit Social Darwinist rhetoric: 9 whatever terminology was used, legal materials from the period Charles Beard used to tell his students: the historian's 'best equipment' is to remember that 'the very opposite of accepted faith may be true' (quoted in Ellen Nore, 'Charles A. Beard There is a generational pattern, of course, to today's revisions of revisionists; now scholars search for order in the period roughly from 1880 to 1920 and some profess little faith that we would know a Progressive or a robber baron if we saw one. ( from the 1880s into the 1920s suggest that combating paternalism was a core concern among judges and lawyers. Americans need not have read or believed all of Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics, of course, to fear governmental regulation and to celebrate the autonomy of vigorous, manly citizens free of invidious, paternalistic coddling. As Charles Sanders Peirce put it, in an age pervaded by a 'dominant gospel of greed', men 'seemed to relish a ruthless theory'. o It was a period in which the great race of life, premised somehow on the notion of an equal start, was a dominant American image. The tendency to harden this egalitarian image into ruthlessness gained strength from innumerable, mutually enforcing influences, including bedrock Calvinist values, Ben Franklin-like homilies, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s bitter deference to the cosmos, and the muscular Christianity of the period, which promoted the quest for manliness and godliness in the gymnasium, on distant battlefields, and in legal and economic combat.
Robert Gordon recently noted that Americans came to be 'obsessively judge-centered"' in the late nineteenth century; I will explore a few elements of what that obsession might have entailed. In particular, I will discuss the incoherence of anti-paternalism, which was a basic facet of the an element of the mentalitg or consciousness of legal opinion-makers who gained professional ascendancy from the Gilded Age into the early Jazz Age-men from a cohort sharply reduced in numbers by the Civil War and perhaps hardened by it as well-I will consider the legal construct of the autonomous individual by focusing upon judicial decisions which added to or subtracted from that legal fiction. The Justices' mathematical machinations allowed them to become the nation's ultimate paternalists, even as they devoted themselves tenaciously to rooting out paternalism whenever they perceived it. The manipulability of the paternalism concept in constitutional law after the end of Reconstruction and the paradoxical results of such manipulation remain largely unexplored. It is revealing to consider to what extent those already on top benefited and those on or near the bottom suffered as a result of the process through which Justices made their choices. Several themes emerge from scrutiny of a series of relatively obscure Supreme Court decisions handed down when laissez-faire thought was dominant. First, I respond briefly to recent legal history revisionists as I examine the breakdown of the notion of unified American citizenship. Then, confining my discussion largely to enforcement of contracts through a focus on thirteenth amendment challenges, I explore what judges seem to have meant by individual freedom. Finally, I argue that paternalism provided a convenient, almost infinitely distensible target: it enabled the Justices to bull their way through complexities in order to constitutionalize their antipaternalistic notions and to act as if their ideas had been deduced from some deep structure of constitutional liberty.
In recent years, historians have begun to focus on the elusive concept of paternalism largely but not exclusively in the context of slavery. 1 4 A series of snapshots taken from Supreme Court decisions about the thirteenth amendment, however, involves not only black people, as we would expect, but also a more varied cast of characters. In fact, it is reminiscent of Peter Pan.' 5 Sailors, Indians, and others often considered eternal children found themselves before the Supreme Court in thirteenth amendment disputes.
14. The pathbreaking work is Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York, 1974) and it is criticized in James Oakes, The Ruling Race (New York, 1982 Moreover, he seemed quite safe on the issue of paternalism. In a book review for Chicago's fledgling literary magazine, The Dial, Fuller had written: 'Paternalism, with its constant intermeddling with individual freedom, has no place in a system which rests for its strength upon the self-reliant energies of the people." 8 This widely-shared, if not hackneyed, sentiment coincided with the views of Cleveland and most Democrats; it was also not terribly far removed from the proclamations of many Republicans. ' 9 The legal harvest of Civil War reforms in constitutional amendments and civil rights statutes largely had been lost already. A remarkable string of Supreme Court decisions either invalidated or narrowed to the point of oblivion the constitutional commands and statutory protections enacted during the first decade after the war. 20 Supreme Court declared that black citizens had already shaken off the effects of slavery, noting that their progress was now such that they should 'take the rank of a mere citizen' and cease to be the 'special favorites of the laws'.21 By the time Fuller reached the bench, the Court had declared that corporations also were to enjoy fourteenth amendment protection. 22 Thus whites, blacks and corporations were considered self-sufficient equals before the law. Judges would ensure formal equality: no favoritism would be allowed, and class legislation was unconstitutional. 23 Paternalism, a most insidious sort of favoritism, was anathema. In 1888, therefore, American citizenship appeared to be a clear concept. There were exceptions, of course, such as Indians. 24 Moreover, distinctions between civil and political rights explained why female citizens could be treated differently in certain spheres. 25 Social rights constituted still another realm, a realm government could not enter. 26 Yet contemporary descriptions of citizenship by late nineteenth century Americans inextricably linked and often equated citizenship with self-sufficiency, manhood, and individualism.
Despite a common assumption that Congress was almost moribund during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Fuller and his colleagues often confronted legal claims involving federal legislation which Congress enacted despite frequent congressional deadlocks produced by evenlymatched, loyal party alignments, antiquated rules, and the waning of reform impulses following the Panic of 1873 and the Compromise of 1877. Still more legislative activity took place on the state level. 27 This increase in 26. Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883), in which the Supreme Court declared that 'it would be running the slavery argument into the ground' to hold that the thirteenth amendment guaranteed non-discriminatory practices in public theaters, hotels and the like.
27. See, e.g., Loren P. Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, supra note legislation combined with other factors to undermine the monochromatic vision of citizenship. Nevertheless, the idealized American citizen, able to care for himself, remained a pervasive image. Indeed, in 1889 Lord Bryce reported in The American Commonwealth that 'so far as there can be said to be any theory on the subject in a land which gets on without theories, laissez aller is the orthodox and accepted doctrine in the sphere both of Federal and State legislation' 28 Yet Bryce emphasized the total inaccuracy of this theory. He wrote: 'Nevertheless the belief is groundless. The new democracies of America are just as eager for state interference as the democracy of England, and try their experiments with even more light-hearted promptitude.' 29 Though in many respects Americans tolerated legislative interference with personal autonomy more than did their English counterparts, Bryce observed that 'few but lawyers and economists have yet become aware of it, and the lamentations with which old-fashioned English thinkers accompany the march of legislation are in America scarcely heard and wholly unheeded'. 3 o But American judges were poised to listen, to hear, and to react to their own lamentations and to do so with authority and an American accent.
We now know that there was a large gap between lawyerly exhortations to avoid paternalism and the willingness of judges to resist legislative interventions on behalf of the citizenry. Moreover, the most striking pronouncements invalidating protective legislation were concentrated in state courts. 3 ' Recent scholarship suggests that even Justice Stephen J. Field occasionally rejected laissez-faire in the 1880s and 1890s, and that Justice David Brewer was not such a totally doctrinaire fellow after all. 32 We also have begun to recognize that realist roots can be found even within the bedrock of High Formalism; now it also appears that a prophetic iconoclast such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. had his formal moments.
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Yet so many judges wrote so vigorously on the imminent danger of the loss of American individualism and the evils of rampant paternalism from the Gilded Age through the 1920s that it is difficult to choose the best illustration. My favorite is a West Virginia Supreme Court decision, State v. Goodwill, 34 which invalidated a state law requiring mine and factory owners to pay workers in legal currency rather than scrip. Such statutory interference with the poor man's patrimony, his right to choose how to contract for his own labor, was held to violate 'the essential distinction between freedom and slavery; between liberty and oppression'. 35 This preoccupation with slavery, combined with the assumption of a clearcut binary choice between slavery and freedom, is typical of the period. 36 Moreover, according to the Court's president, Judge Snyder, such 'sumptuary legislation' had been 'universally condemned' and recognized as an attempt to degrade the intelligence, virtue, and manhood of the American laborer, and foist upon the people a paternal government of the most objectionable character, because it assumes that the employer is a knave, and the laborer an imbecile. Such regulation interfered with the 'natural law of supply and demand', Snyder asserted, and was an effort to have the government 'do for its people what they can do for themselves'.
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The United States Supreme Court never went quite as far as the West Virginia Court in denouncing legislative efforts to protect the populace. Even the well-known statements of Justice Brewer, for example, who wrote that, '[t]he paternal theory of government is to me odious', and that 'Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward was in fact nearer than a dream', tended to be in dissent. 39 The more dramatic exclamations by the Justices usually were delivered in speeches off the bench. 40 Nevertheless, in the relatively obscure decisions I will consider, Brewer and his fellow Justices did a great deal both in their reasoning and their results to suggest that there is something to the stereotyped view of the Supreme Court as a bastion of laissez-faire ideology.41
Two forgotten 1890 decisions provide a good introduction to the Fuller Court's inconsistency between its proclamations and its actions concerning paternalism. In opinions written by Brewer, a unanimous court upheld two convictions for desertion from the Army. One case involved someone too young to enlist and the other a man too old. Brewer argued that a contract to join the Army changed an individual's status and that his new status became irreversible. 42 In In re Morrissey, a habeas corpus petition alleged that a seventeen year-old enlisted without his mother's consent, although her consent clearly was required by federal statute. Brewer reasoned that the statutory provision was 'for the benefit of the parent', and therefore 'the 38. Ibid Once the parties agreed to a contract, therefore, iron legal rules assured enforcement. The Grimley and Morrissey decisions were not much noticed. Yet their interstitial pronouncements are illuminating, and quite consistent with laissez-faire values, even as they demonstrate the familiar but odd connection between reverence for individual autonomy and the great deference accorded to both the objective legitimacy of legal rules and the power of the military arm of the federal government.
Some of the most striking decisions of the Fuller Court comport with this formalistic approach. In upholding the exclusion of Chinese aliens, for example, despite obvious abrogation of treaty obligations and blatant procedural abuses, the Court explicitly accorded Congress unbounded power. 48 Similarly, Justice Brewer invoked the broadest kind of inherent federal power to meet 'the duty to secure rights to all citizens' by validating President Cleveland's use of 'the strong arm' of federal troops to put down 43 The Court was far less bold, however, in its construction of the thirteenth amendment, and in its interpretation of federal power in statutes premised upon the enforcement section of that amendment. The Court's explanations for its restrictive approach relate directly to the issue of whether protection inevitably involves disability.
II. Paternal Consideration: Action and Inaction
Before I consider thirteenth amendment challenges to Draconian enforcement of contract law in cases not explicitly concerned with race, several aspects of Plessy v. Ferguson 53 merit consideration. These generally are overlooked amid outrage at the equal protection language and holding in Plessy that legitimized deference to racial classifications.
Homer Plessy had attacked Louisiana's law separating the races on streetcars because, he claimed, that law imposed a badge of slavery forbidden by the thirteenth amendment. Rejecting his claim, Justice Henry B. Brown explained that any stigma involved in the required separation was entirely in the eyes of the beholder. Brown also asserted that it was 'too clear for argument' that the thirteenth amendment abolished nothing but slavery, bondage, and at least 'the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and services' .54 Obviously, this definition of servitude 49 . In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586, 582 (1895). The position ultimately vindicated in the Debs case, of course, was that of George Pullman, whose relations with his workers in his town of Pullman, Illinois may have made him the foremost paternalist of the day.
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 160 U.S. 688 (1896).
51. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). As constitutional law students still learn, the Court attempted to draw an impossible line between manufacturing and commerce, and thereby determined that Congress could not reach the Sugar Trust, though it controlled 98% of the nation's sugar. But, when this great principle [of equal protection] comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and security. The status of a person is his legal position or condition . . . . The term is chiefly applied to persons under disability, or persons who have some peculiar condition which prevents the general law from applying to them in the same way as it does to ordinary persons. The question of status is of importance in jurisprudence, because it is generally treated as a basis for the classification of law, according as it applies to ordinary persons (general law, normal law, law of things), or to persons having a status, i.e., a disability or peculiar legal condition, such as infants, married women, lunatics, convicts, bankrupts, aliens, public officers, etc.
(particular law, abnormal law, law of persons). federal statute under which they were detained for deserting ship and for not following orders. 6 ' From the 'somewhat meager' 62 record, it appeared that the men signed shipping orders for an overseas voyage of uncertain destination. When they abandoned ship, an Oregon justice of the peace imprisoned them for sixteen days until the Arago was again ready to sail. Then, when the trio refused an order to 'turn to', the three were charged with refusing to work and a federal marshal imprisoned then in San Francisco.
C. Vann
Seeking release through habeas corpus, the seamen claimed that the two periods of confinement amounted to enforcement of involuntary servitude. The Court's holding was that the seamen, who voluntarily signed shipping orders, could not complain that their service had become involuntary. The thirteenth amendment did not interfere with an individual's freedom to 'contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose', 63 even if it meant subordinating his will. Brown used a vast array of historical sources-a veritable tour deforce of the worst kind of law office history-to prove that imprisonment was merely a modern example of the time-honored legal tradition of protecting sailors from themselves. Brown.explained this ancient, abiding paternalistic commitment as follows:
Seamen are treated by Congress ... as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing the protection of the law in the same sense in which minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians. 64 In fact, Brown went so far as to assert that '[tihe ancient characterization of seamen as "wards of admiralty" is even more accurate now than it was formerly' .65 Still, Brown did not reach the extreme position of Solicitor General Holmes Conrad, who argued that, like soldiers, seamen 'cease to be independent, separate and distinct beings' 66 once they contract for service. They change their status, he asserted, and become mere 'integers' and 'parts of a machine'. 67 Yet Brown chose to celebrate the 1872 amendments that added imprisonment to the 1790 Seaman's Act; he considered these provisions to be legislation designed to protect seamen 'as far as possible, against the consequences of their own ignorance and improvidence' .68
165 U.S. 275 (1897).

The Shipping
In his scathing dissent, Harlan foresaw advertisements for fugitive seamen replicating those for fugitive slaves. He dismissed Brown's historical citations as products of earlier times 'when no account was taken of man as man'.69 Harlan said the thirteenth amendment forbade any compulsion to serve another in private business. He agreed that seamen were generally ignorant and improvident, but argued that this compelled increased solicitude by courts. Harlan sharply rejected the idea that protecting seamen could include the use of force to compel seamen to render personal service. 70 In Robertson v. Baldwin, one man's version of needed protection proved to be another's idea of involuntary servitude; the distinction made a constitutional difference.
Indian Wards
American Indians traditionally presented a special case for paternalism. The crux of the Reservation Indian problem, according to Harvard Law School's James Bradley Thayer, was that Indians were 'A People Without Law' . 71 In two Atlantic Monthly articles in 1891, Thayer provided a compelling review of abuses and misconceived attempts at Indian aid. He stressed that the federal government now owed an affirmative duty to the Indians and 66. Brief for Appellee at 10, Robertson.
Ibid.
Robertson, 165 U.S. at 293 (1897).
Ibid. at 303.
70. By the end of 1898, Congress had adopted Harlan's views in the White Act, which eliminated all imprisonment for desertion, except for a one-month maximum for desertion in foreign ports not vigorously opposed by the sailors' unions, and regulated the seaman's diet and the contract allotment system with great specificity. insisted that 'the mere neglect or refusal to act is itself action, and action of the worst kind'.
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The Supreme Court had acknowledged the mess Thayer described even before Fuller arrived. In United States v. Kagama, for example, Justice Gray emphasized the extreme dependence of Indian tribes on the federal government, the problem of local hostility, and the great extent to which the 'very weakness and helplessness' of the Indians was itself 'due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them'. 73 The Fuller and White courts wrestled and lost many bouts with the need to define the 'duty of protection' endorsed by Thayer and Gray. Matters were complicated further by the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, which was premised on the assumption that in their tribal units the Indians lacked the 'selfishness which is at the bottom of civilization'. 7 The Severalty Act attempted to use Congress's absolute control over Indian affairs to force individual property holding by breaking up the tribes and allotting their land to be held in trust by the federal government. It produced dozens of Supreme Court decisions further clouding the issue of Indian status. The Court often changed direction, in part because the Justices struggled constantly to maintain a vision of completely separate spheres of state and federal sovereignty.
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The only Indian case that I have found which raised a thirteenth amendment claim, however, was United States v. Choctaw Nation. 76 This strange controversy was the culmination of forty years of dispute between the federal government, several tribes, and their former black slaves. The Choctaw and Chickasaw joined the Confederate side in the Civil War. When the tribes signed treaties with the federal government in 1866, they agreed not only to free their slaves, but also to give them the option of being adopted and, thereby, of sharing the rights of tribe members, including suffrage and forty acres of land each. The United States was to hold $300,000 in trust and to subtract payments to freed slaves who opted to leave the reservations rather than to join the tribes. The Choctaw themselves had been before the Court in 1886, arguing that a formal release which they had signed and which purportedly waived federal treaty obligations dating from Andrew Jackson's presidency could not be binding, since the Choctaw signed under the duress of dire necessity. Plaintiffs' attorney Samuel Shellabarger cited several Supreme Court decisions to support the idea that, under such circumstances, legal formalities would yield to equitable considerations. 77 The federal government's brief responded that forcing the Indians to remove across the Mississippi in violation of the earlier agreement was prompted not by 'lust of territory' but rather by 'a sincere desire to accomplish what was best for the Indian and the white man, by eliminating the disturbing element that would live in savagery, and planting it where it would be untrammeled by even the proximity of civilization, neither molesting nor being molested ' .78 In deciding that 1886 case, the Supreme Court noted that the relation of the federal government to the Choctaw was one 'between a superior and inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and control of the former'. 79 The United States owed Indians 'care and protection'. Accordingly, the Court abjured the 'technical rules' that would use the release the Indians signed to defeat their claims and relied instead on 'that larger reason which constitutes the spirit of the law of nations ' .80 Now, in 1904, former black slaves and their descendants were before the Court, trying to hold the Choctaws to treaty obligations. The federal government took the side of the blacks, but sought only to purchase land for them with the $300,000, and did not claim that the United States had fulfilled its part of the treaty.
In Replying to the freedmen's fallback claim to the $300,000 trust fund, the Court stated that the fund was only for those freedmen who left the tribe, and none had done so. Although neither the Indians nor the United States had obeyed the treaty, the freedmen had no rights beyond formal emancipation from slavery. This result illustrates rule-boundedness run riot. It is almost a parody. Because no one followed the rules, the Court reasoned, the blacks who were least well off necessarily should be left in that position. No other rules could be found. If the freedmen wished a different result, they should have used the appropriate legal forms. As a constitutional matter, in the context of broken promises all around, the 'declaration of universal freedom'84 proclaimed by the thirteenth amendment was interpreted to mean freedom only from formal, coercive bondage.
III. The Perils of Full Citizenship: Contracts and Peonage
Black citizens soon were sent this message of a restrictive interpretation of the thirteenth amendment even more emphatically. Unlike Indians, who occupied a kind of never-never land as permanent wards of the government, blacks were formally full legal citizens. They often were told that they should use democratic processes to change things if they wished and that they should not expect judicial intervention on their behalf. is told well elsewhere, 86 so I will mention only briefly the Supreme Court's manipulation of thirteenth amendment doctrine in 1905-1906, narrowing the reach of the criminal peonage statute to such a fine point that even had prosecutors been angelic, they could hardly dance their prosecutorial dances upon it. In Clyatt v. United States, 87 the Court overturned one of the few successful peonage prosecutions. Justice Brewer upset the conviction of a brutal white overseer in the southern Georgia and Florida turpentine farms. Although unwilling to accept the extreme states' rights construction of the thirteenth amendment advanced by Senator Bacon and Congressman Brantley on behalf of the defendants, the Court refused to define peonage more broadly than as 'a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master' .88 Brewer emphasized that debt was the necessary 'basal' condition. 89 Though one might contract to become a peon voluntarily, Brewer conceded, 'a clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering services in payment of a debt'.9 0 Justice Harlan, dissenting, found it 'going very far', in a case 'disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against these negroes' ,9 to hold that the trial court erred in letting the case go to the jury.
Clyatt was a clear 'go slow' message to the prosecutors, judges, and victims trying to reform the southern peonage system. Though the Supreme Court was unwilling to abrogate the thirteenth amendment entirely, as the construction proposed by Clyatt's lawyers had suggested, the call for restraint in Clyatt grew louder the following term in Hodges v. United States.
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Hodges and two co-defendants were convicted and sentenced to the statutory maximum for their role in a mob effort to intimidate eight blacks into leaving their jobs at an Arkansas lumber mill. Brewer again wrote for the Court, but now he embraced a strong states' rights argument and merged it with the notion that the thirteenth amendment was 'not an attempt to commit [blacks] to the care of the Nation'. 93 Rejecting the argument that harassment of black workers was a badge or vestige of slavery, Brewer remanded them to Arkansas law for redress. To do otherwise, Brewer stated, would be to treat blacks as 'wards of the Nation'. 94 Such a paternalistic approach was rejected, he explained, because at the end of the Civil War, Congress decided to grant blacks citizenship, on the assumption that'thereby in the long run their best interests would be subserved, they taking their chances with other citizens in the States where they should make their homes ' .95 This construction of the Civil War Amendments was a stark proclamation of the 'equal chance in the race of life' approach. It flowed naturally from the Court's distaste for national government intervention. It also reflected the Court's failure to take account of the brutal facts emerging from studies and muckraking articles about the labor system in the South. Once again Justice Harlan wrote in dissent to argue the inconsistency in the Court's announced belief in the liberty of contract; he pointed to the anomaly of ignoring the pleas for '[n]ational protection' by 'millions of citizenlaborers of African descent' ,96 who were denied what he viewed as their right to earn a lawful living solely because of their race. This failure to protect, Harlan proclaimed, betrayed the thirteenth amendment promise, which 'destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established freedom' 97 and had 'an affirmative operation the moment it was adopted' .98
The Hodges decision is less well known than Clyatt and the Bailey v. Alabama 99 decision which followed, but Hodges provides a clear demonstration of the paradox of paternalism. To protect blacks, it was argued, invariably was to disable them. In the majority's view, to give blacks the special protection of national laws was to treat them as wards and, in the long run, to undermine their chances of successful competition with all other citizens. Notions of federalism entered the equation, of course, but the Court's central thrust was to sustain an ideal form of unified citizenship and to command formal equality for all. In opposing this position, Harlan took something of a realist's view of the social and political position of blacks. He claimed, in effect, that blacks could and should be treated as special. 93 . Ibid. at 16. Brewer reasoned that since the thirteenth amendment reached all persons, and since Chinese laborers now had to carry certificates as free Negroes did during slavery, the thirteenth amendment could not affect wrongs to persons not shown in the record to be slaves or the descendants of slaves. State law was said to be the place to go to seek remedies. Ironically, Harlan's Hodges dissent also rested firmly on the very precedents which allowed the Court to 'Lochnerize' on behalf of a particular judicial vision of freedom of contract.
Within the next few years, the Court's majorities showed some willingness to limit the Lochner approach. The best-known example was Muller v. Oregon,'°° upholding Oregon's limitation of the number of hours women could work in laundries. Muller is famous for the Court's nod toward the facts marshalled by Louis D. Brandeis and June Goldmark in a brief in defense of the statute, but it more recently has become something of a target in debates over sex discrimination. Justice Brewer's majority opinion rested on factual assumptions that women were naturally 'at a disadvantage in the race for subsistence' and therefore 'not upon an equality' with men.' 0 ' To Brewer and the majority, it was natural to treat women paternalistically. Unlike blacks, women were not to be considered equals in life's natural struggles.
Muller's legally permissible paternalism by a state contrasted sharply with several contemporaneous holdings severely limiting the power of Congress to regulate employment relationships. 0 2 The Court also sent back to the lower court an attempt by a group of progressives, covertly backed by Booker T. Washington, to challenge Alabama's farm labor system.1 0 3
When this case, Bailey v. Alabama, returned to the Supreme Court in 1911, Bailey's claim of involuntary servitude directly posed the question of how far the thirteenth amendment might go to invalidate a contract that appeared to have been entered into voluntarily. In other words, did the federal Constitution restrict the power of a state to enforce contracts?
Bailey was portrayed as 'a mere pawn' in the reformer's challenge to criminal convictions for breach of a year-long, twelve dollar per month labor contract. Ray Stannard Baker publicized 'the unmistakable marks of ignorance, inertia, irresponsibility' in Bailey's 'dull black face', yet Baker also celebrated Bailey's victory as 'another bar ... placed in the way of the strong white man who would take advantage of the weaker colored man'. 104 To Justice Hughes, who wrote for the majority in one of his first Supreme Court opinions, Alabama's presumption of criminal fraud in the breach of a contract, and its law limiting the defendant's ability to testify about his intent at the time he agreed to the contract, furnished 'an instrument of compulsion, particularly effective as against the poor and ignorant, its most likely victims'. 105 Because the thirteenth amendment 'was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag',106 it invalidated Alabama's attempt to enforce labor contracts in this way. Hughes stated that the amendment prohibited all 'control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit'. 1 07 Hughes began by insisting that the defendant's race was irrelevant, as was the fact that the contract was made in a southern state. Hughes also said he was unwilling to impute any oppressive intent to anyone in the case. Nevertheless, Alabama's enforcement scheme would make a barren thesis out of 'freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based'. 1 08 It was therefore invalid.
Holmes, who had not approved of earlier constitutional freedom of contract claims, saw the majority opinion as an encroachment on the power of states to enforce contracts effectively. 'The Thirteenth Amendment does not outlaw contracts for labor',°109 he proclaimed. In fact, Holmes suggested Alabama's scheme actually might aid the laborer, who would suffer because the majority's decision to remove the enforcement mechanism would limit the terms of the bargain a laborer like Bailey could make. Holmes summarized his position as follows:
Breach of a legal contract without excuse is wrong conduct, even if the contract is for labor, and if a State adds to civil liability a criminal liability to fine, it simply intensifies the legal motive for doing right, it does not make the laborer a slave.
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Holmes accused the majority of tacitly assuming that Alabama juries would be prejudiced. To the contrary, Holmes suggested, fair juries would sometimes acquit: it was perfectly appropriate for Alabama to leave ambiguous decisions to juries since 'their experience as men of the world""I might have taught them that laborers frequently accept advances, work for part of the season, and then go off to other plantations seeking better wages.
In a sense, Hughes and Holmes agreed that individual freedom of contract was a paramount value. Their real conflict was over the permissible degree of government intervention.' 1 2 Hughes viewed the thirteenth amendment as an 'overdrive', so that both government and individual power over another individual were limited by it. Holmes was much more the formalist, willing to suppose that Alabama juries would be fair and that deference was due the legislature. Hughes adopted a pose of not looking behind the formal categories of the law, but he could not avoid seeing 'poor' and 'ignorant' farm workers" 13 in need of the Court's protection, no matter what contracts they might have signed. In a sense, while alleging belief in freedom of labor, Hughes joined Ray Stannard Baker in a directly paternalistic effort to ensure that the Constitution would protect farm laborers from themselves, at least insofar as they signed year-long contracts from which no real escape was possible. Holmes rejected such paternalism, and argued that economics explained how Alabama's enforcement scheme actually could benefit farm laborers.
The Court soon extended its Bailey holding to the pervasive, vicious criminal surety system. United States v. Reynolds" 14 was a carefully arranged test prosecution that challenged an Alabama law allowing employers to pay the fines of people convicted of crimes and then to keep them working until fines and costs were repaid. Alabama defended the system as a humane alternative to the chain gang. The state also alleged the added benefit of leaving the convict free to choose for himself whether he wanted to take part. 115 The Supreme Court did not find these humanitarian arguments convincing. In fact, Justice Day noted for a unanimous Court that 'the convict is kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude'.116 Because the convict's service was owed to private parties and not to the state, the thirteenth amendment applied. In a revealing concurrence, Holmes repeated his objections to the Bailey decision, but went on to say: But impulsive people with little intelligence or foresight may be expected to lay hold of anything that affords a relief from present pain even though it will cause greater trouble by and by. could agree that 'the inevitable' and 'contemplated' outcome of the Alabama laws should be invalidated. 118
Even the unanimous Reynolds decision demonstrated that it was difficult for the Court to determine when an individual's freedom to contract might actually be so constricted as to allow intervention to regulate that freedom. Within a year, the Court extended the Adair decision and the Lochner approach to the states in Coppage v. Kansas," 9 invalidating a Kansas ban on anti-union, 'yellow dog' labor contracts. Freedom of contract remained sufficiently vital to preclude intervention in labor-management affairs, particularly when the state's policy suggested redistribution of wealth or power. Legislation would be struck down as paternalistic when it was perceived to interfere excessively with equality of exploitation.
IV. The Thirteenth Amendment Takes a Holiday
Thirteenth amendment challenges to involuntary servitude reached the Court several more times while White was Chief Justice. In the first two cases, individuals challenged traditional forms of forced labor. The Court had little difficulty in affirming Florida's power to use its criminal law to force people who were unable to hire substitutes to work on road crews. 120 Then, against a background of war fever and anti-German hysteria, the Court disposed of a thirteenth amendment challenge to the World War I draft in a single paragraph: White scoffed at the idea of constitutional doubt about the government's power to compel military service.' 2 ' At the close of the Fuller-White era, it was somehow fitting that property owners were the final litigants to invoke the thirteenth amendment. They did so in a broad attack on post-World War I rent control provisions in New York City. 122 The landlords failed to convince the Court that rent controland the requirement that they supply heat and water without being able to raise the rent-constituted a badge or incident of servitude. In majority opinions in two companion cases, 123 Justice Holmes noted that the shortage of emergency housing was 'a publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact'. Perhaps Holmes's attention to facts differed from his focus in Bailey, as some suggested, in part because Holmes had begun to fall under the influence of his colleague, Justice Brandeis, and to heed Brandeis's fact-focused approach.' 24 In the rent control cases, the facts allowed Holmes to defer to legislative restrictions on the ability of landlords to make the contracts they chose in the housing market. Holmes's opinions evoked bitter, rather personal dissents. Three Justices joined McKenna's warning to Holmes and the majority that they were opening the way for 'socialism, or some form of socialism' which would destroy 'personal rights and the purposeful encouragement of individual incentive and energy'. 125 Though Concern and care for the child had to remain exclusively with the states and the parents to whom states might delegate authority. 130 Work even in mines and factories was beyond Congress's constitutional ken. If paternalism toward children were to be allowed, it had to flow from the proper authorities. For the dissenters, Holmes pointed to the majority's inconsistency in allowing Congress to regulate oleomargarine, lottery tickets, the so-called White Slave trade, and strong drink, but not child labor.
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' During the early Taft years, avoiding paternalism still meant invalidation of employment contract regulations. 132 Now there was an added wrinkle: striking down a District of Columbia law establishing minimum wages for women, Justice Sutherland claimed that the civil disability of women had reached 'the vanishing point' after passage of the nineteenth amendment. 133 Women should no longer receive special care and protection, but should compete as equals. Holmes, now in his eighties, disagreed: 'It will take more than the nineteenth amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women, or that the legislature cannot take those differences into account.' 34 Thus, by 1923 the Court no longer relegated women to what the Justices saw as their natural God-given place. 35 Like blacks forty years earlier, women were now proclaimed to be full citizens. They had achieved suijuris legal status. The Court claimed that intermeddling through a minimum wage requirement would violate the constitutional presumption that each and every individual enjoys freedom of contract.
The Hammer and Adkins decision show that the Court had managed to come full circle. Just as seventeen year-olds could enlist in the army without the parental consent that was required by statute, so parents could send minors to the cotton mills while congressional attempts to intervene were held unconstitutional. Avoidance of paternalism permitted the Justices to pick and choose who would be protected, and to what degree, according to their own lights.
The very indeterminacy of the paternalism concept created a basic paradox of paternalism during the years Fuller and White were the Chief Justices. The Court enthusiastically thrust itself into the role of the ultimate paternalist. Lacking any coherent theory to confine their discretion, the Justices simply assumed the role of fathers who knew best.
V. Conclusion
After World War I, the Supreme Court was poised to join or even to lead the country in its quest for a return to normalcy. Had the Justices paused to assess the status of paternalism when Taft joined them in 1921, they might have seen that earlier constitutional efforts to confine and control the threat were inconsistent and largely unavailing. The federal judiciary had not succeeded in its effort, as Brooks Adams put it, 'to dislocate any comprehensive body of legislation whose effect would be to change the social status'. 136 But protecting individuals and the nation from the dangers of ibid. at 562, is revealing. Taft clearly seemed to favor the result reached by the majority, but recognized that the precedents pointed the other way. He wrote, 'I have always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio' since the Court had begun 'laboriously pricking out a line' between the police power and liberty. Ibid. at 564, 562.
135. Compare Adkins with, e.g., MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) , in which the Court upheld a woman's loss of American citizenship when she married a foreigner.
McKenna wrote for the Court: 'The identity of husband and wife is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence. It was neither accidental nor arbitrary and worked in many instances for her protection'. Ibid. at 311. He continued: 'There has been, it is true, much relaxation of it but in its retention as in its origin it is determined by their intimate relation and unity of interest, and this relation and unity may make it of public concern in many instances to merge their identity, and give dominance to the husband. ' debilitating legislative protection was not a cause to be abandoned lightly and the Taft Court tried to stem the tide. The mask covering the direct connection between halting paternalism and maintaining the economic and social status quo had begun to slip a bit. Holmes even suggested in his Coppage dissent that the Constitution would not forbid a state to 'establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins'. 37 Thus Holmes suggested that state intervention could precede individual contract decisions. This odor of redistribution probably provoked some of the most vehement fulminations against paternalism by the Coppage and Adkins majorities. After all, if any constitutional doctrine seemed settled during the prior half century, it was the impermissibility of redistribution by government. 13 The conflation of paternalism and redistribution is significant. Today, we have some sense that politics near the turn of the century was actually the politics of redistribution, 139 and that state and federal governments have played redistributive roles throughout our history. 40 Yet there is probably no more basic strand of ideology-in a country without much of an ideological tradition-than unexamined enthusiasm for individualism and self-help.
If the Fuller and White Courts provoked criticism at times and even threats of reprisals, 14 1 the Justices also tapped into a fundamental American theme when they set out to choose who was a permissible subject for protection and what legislative initiatives were acceptable. Richard Hofstadter said in The Age of Reform:
One of the primary tests of the mood of a society at any given time is whether its comfortable people tend to identify, psychologically, with the power and achievements of the very successful or with the needs and sufferings of the underprivileged. In a large and striking measure the Progressive agitations turned the human sympathies of the people downward rather than upward in the social scale. 142 The Supreme Court from 1888-1921 reacted by assuming the role of guardian against expression of such sympathies in law.
Deciding when to permit paternalism certainly is not an easy task. It can be difficult and sometimes impossible to distinguish between providing for people and deciding for them. Yet promiscuous use of the pejorative 'paternalism' interferes with any possibility of creating structures for, and providing analysis of, crucial distinctions. The Court's struggle to identify and patrol paternalism, employing a priori categorizations and legal or scientific ideals allegedly deduced from first principles, became a juggling act that was hard to sustain while performing 'the giddy trapeze act' of constitutional law. 143 Some paternalism goes with any judge's territory, of course, and more is attached to the judicial icons at the Supreme Court. But the Fuller and White Courts used the threat of paternalism to arrogate an unusual degree of authority to themselves. The Justices set out to cleave the popular will from the popular whim, as James Russell Lowell once phrased the distinction. 44 The boundary they sought to establish to contain paternalism provided the Justices with a kind of constitutional accordion. They never approached a coherent theory of how to classify litigants or when it was appropriate to defer to legislative judgments. Instead, the Justices attempted to be the ultimate guardians of all Americans and American values.
It may be 'a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are the same thing',145 but my point is not that a number of Justices during this period could probably be called very bad lawyers. Rather, it is that the Justices' efforts to deploy legal doctrine to contain paternalism provided particularly effective protective coloration for the interposition of their own values. Legal values, in turn, both reflected and helped to form the views of powerful contemporaries.
Through the lens of anti-paternalism, those victimized in societal struggle had only themselves to blame. Losers belonged in their places if winners could designate their status as fitting or natural. By seeking to constitutionalize what was seen as scientific and necessary, the Justices acted not only in paradoxical fashion, but with a fashionable scientism that now often seems tragic as well. Aggressive efforts to maintain a binary constitutional distinction between admirable autonomy and insidious paternalism characterized the Gilded Age through the time of Harding and Coolidge. We may have learned the lessons of the past so well that we are able to repeat its mistakes almost exactly.
